SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS:
LAW AND POLITICS IN PERSPECTIVE
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The contemporary disposition toward the socialist approach to human
rights, focused principally upon Soviet practice in the context of the 1975
Helsinki Final Act,' at the present seems to be without well-articulated means-

end relationships and objectives.
This is not to say that the present critique is deficient in expectations. The
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights has explicitly established the
aspirational humanitarian objectives of this epoch.2 Neither does the critique
of socialist practice lack its grievances. These are principally centered on socialist, cum Soviet, practice contrary to the human rights undertakings fashioned in this generation to give effect to the 1948 Declaration.' These international standards, unlike the 1948 Declaration, are not merely aspirational,
but are as legally binding as any international treaty can be.4 The enumeration of specific shortfalls from these standards, or of pointed violation of their
clear requirements, are well catalogued. 5 The elimination of these disparities
* Major, Judge Advocate General's Corps, United States Army; Chief, International Law Division, The Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Va. The author's views do not purport to reflect those of the U.S. Army or Defense Dept.
1. Final Act, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, done at Helsinki, August 1,
1975, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 8826, GENERAL FOREIGN POLICY SERIES 298 [hereinafter
cited as Final Act]; 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1292 [hereinafter cited as ILM].

2. International Bill of Human Rights: A Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
3. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A.
Res. 2106, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965); International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200,
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); the Soviet Union has ratified the
above three instruments; Final Act, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, supra
note 1.
4. The Helsinki Final Act is a political undertaking and not a binding arrangement under international law. An unavoidably obligatory tone is imparted; however, to the human rights undertakings of the Final Act by Principle VII, "[rlespect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief:"
In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating States will act
in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They will also fulfil their obligations as
set forth in the international declarations and agreements in this field, including inter
alia the International Covenants on Human Rights, by which they may be bound.
5. Basket Three-Implementation of the Helsinki Accords: Hearings on the Implementation of the
Helsinki Accords Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.,
Vols. I-Ill (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; A CHRONICLE OF CURRENT EVENTS: JOURNAL OF
THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE USSR, Vol. I (Amnesty International trans. 1968); AM-
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and the pursuit of the general humanitarian objectives of the 1948 Declaration, as expanded by subsequent covenants, would seem to establish a necessary means-end program for the present critique. This is not the case.
Instead, this means-end program, difficult to pursue in its own right, has
been complicated, even frustrated, by its entanglement with considerations
from which it should best be kept separate. The objective of expanded human
rights under socialism is ill-served, for instance, by its assimilation directly to
other nations' foreign policy concerns with counter-militarism, specifically
arms limitation and force reduction, or with the containment of Soviet imperialistic tendencies. Finally, there is little prospect for betterment of human
rights within socialist authoritarian states if that betterment is linked to a demand that the authoritarian or socialist nature of such states be substantially
modified.

6

These issues are collateral to an incremental enhancement of human rights
under socialism. Indeed, the expansion of human rights need not be related
directly to the attenuation of militarism, imperialism and authoritarianism, for
these phenomena possess their own dynamic and, with time, will experience
self-attenuation as the result of both regular and internal socio-economic pressures 7 and of the measured application of foreign policy instruments at the
state-to-state level. The human rights factor certainly may be externally aggravated for foreign policy purposes to refocus Soviet attentions somewhat to domestic conditions, but this is not indispensable to the greater foreign policy
objectives of counter-militarism and counter-expansionism. External exploitation of domestic Soviet human rights expectations quite likely has a negative
effect upon latent liberalizing tendencies, since conservative reaction has been
and will be the predictable system response.
The enhancement of human rights in the Soviet system can and should
proceed as the result of ordinary, not induced processes, providing that the
authoritarian socialist state is a fairly permanent establishment and
acknowledging that a human rights change for the better will be slow, perhaps glacially so. This presupposes, too, that the end result will be a compromise synthesis of some adequate level of individual protection with statist socialism, a product somewhat short of Western ideals, but realistic in view of
international and domestic Soviet power factors, and perhaps of Russian cultural considerations.
Consider, for example, the course of Soviet human rights since the death
of Stalin in 1953. There followed a reassessment by the Party of the proper
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40 (1970) [hereinafter cited as AMALRIK].
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balance between state authoritarianism and the right of society to live free of
terror." In 1956, following Khruschev's "secret speech" denouncing the Stalin
excesses,9 a period of relaxation ensued, publicly proclaimed as a return to
the principles of socialist legality originally laid out in Stalin's own mooted
1936 constitution.' 0 To be sure, the control of the Party clearly was maintained, even enhanced; for above all, the Party was to be placed beyond the
terror and manipulation that had deprived it of any operational efficacy since
at least the mid-1930s. Additionally, Soviet society was to pursue the construction of socialism with a cultivated but voluntary discipline, felt by individuals
and translated into positive collective action.
But there followed during this period an internal relaxation of the Soviet
style of governance which had not been experienced since Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP). II This perhaps was a period of searching for new parameters in the relationship of the individual to the socialist state and for the
post-Stalin threshold of the Soviet state's authoritarian preserve. During this
time and for as long as perhaps five years, the Party, under Khruschev,
permitted a controlled and limited resurgence of perceptive literature and art,
said by some to be the self-serving move of Khruschev personally and of the
Party in general to enhance its popular support by a public expurgation of
Stalinistic excesses. 2
Whatever the motive, at the height of the Cold War, Soviet society relaxed
at the popular level, concurrently with the maintenance of high-level Warsaw
Pact-NATO confrontation, with the resubjugation of Hungary, with the tightening of authoritarianism throughout eastern Europe, with the construction
of the Berlin Wall, and the Cuban missile episode.
When the threshold of social relaxation had been approached by 1962,13
8.

L.

SCHAPIRO, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION 573-74 (2nd ed. 1970)
SCHAPIRO]; Z. BRZEZINSKI, THE SOVIET BLOC: UNITY AND CONFLICT 113, 180

after cited as

[herein(1967).

9. See, Khruschev's secret speech to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, 1956, reprinted in THE ANTI-STALIN CAMPAIGN AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM 2
(Russian Institute of Columbia University ed. 1956).
10. KONSTITUTSIA (Constitution) (USSR 1936, amended Nov. 7, 1967) reprinted in J. HAZARD,
THE SOVIET SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT app., at 219 (4th ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as HAZARD].
11. The New Economic Policy (NEP), initiated by the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921,
signalled Lenin's move away from austere "war communism" toward a less collectivist form
whereunder a measure of individual initiative was tolerated, along with a limited restoration of
capitalist economy, again without jeopardy to the Party's leading role. The NEP, in fact, was
pointed at strengthening the position of the Party at its lowest ebb in popularity following the
1917-1920 civil war and the March 1921 Kronstadt Rebellion. By 1927, the NEP was completely
dismantled by Stalin in anticipation of his first Five Year Plan and its forced collectivization, industrialism and reinstitution of rigid state discipline. B. DMYTRYSHYN, USSR: A CONCISE HISTORY

113-21, 143 (2d ed. 1971). The legal aspects of NEP are discussed in HAZARD, supra note 10, at
149-51.
12. Z. BRZEZINSKI &c S. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL POWER: USA/USSR 247 (1964). It was during
this period that Alexander Solzhenitsyn was officially permitted to publish his historical literary
work, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, an account of life in the Stalin labor camps.
13. Khruschev's display of pique over artistic liberalism at a December 1, 1962 art exhibit at
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there was little sign that a regression to the Stalinist style was the desired or
necessary approach to the reapplication of social discipline. Indeed, following
Khruschev's ouster on October 14, 1964, there seemed little substantial cause
for a conservative relapse in the sphere of individual-authority relations. On
the contrary, the major manifestations of Khruschev's unorthodoxy that required conservative compensation lay not in individual-authority relations, but
in his experimentation with the relation of the Party to the economy and in
foreign policy adventurism.
4
These major errors were set straight shortly by Khruschev's successors,'
but a conservative overcompensation in the reapplication of state authority in
the social sphere followed as well. To characterize this shift as overcompensation seems accurate, since at this time there appeared to be no substantial
popular effort to exploit the post-Stalin breathing space for broader political
reform. The programmatic reapplication of state authoritarianism in matters
of public discourse, in literature and in the arts was probably a spillover from
the reassertion of power within top party circles by those holding conservative
values generally. Thus, those who were inclined against unorthodoxy in Partyeconomy relations and in foreign policy were by their nature also disinclined
toward social liberalism. The revival of conservatives at the top of the power
structure signaled a return across the board to bureaucratic conservatism.15
A great deal may be made of "liberal-conservative" factionalism which then
and now exists at the top of the Party and of the effect of this dynamic upon
variations in individual-authority relations. It is proposed here that in the
view of the incumbent conservative leadership, such variations are a byproduct of other concerns, rather than the result of conscious manipulations, as
they were under Khruschev. That human rights are not now permitted to
float to their optimal level, as may have been the trend during the Khruschev
de-Stalinization period, is the function of two factors.
First, assuming that it was not a self-serving manipulation by Khruschev,
post-Stalin liberalization occurred during a period of fairly high Soviet national solidarity and in fact served to enhance that solidarity. Second, and correlatively, there existed at Stalin's death little "other-mindedness" in a Soviet
population cowed by the Stalin terror. 16 The social liberalization that followed
until at least 1963 was a fairly well controlled social process, guided by the
Party with society following at a measured pace. Concurrently with the instituthe Manege in Moscow is thought to represent the end of the post-Stalin relaxation. Fainsod, The
Role of Intellectuals in the Soviet Union, in MAN, STATE, AND SOCIETY IN THE SOVIET UNION 478 (J.
Nogee ed. 1972).
14. SCHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 572-80.
15. See R. MEDVEDEV, ON SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY 48-49 (E. de Kadt trans. and ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as MEDVEDEV], analyzing the Party's return to conservatism, a movement that
Medvedev does not indorse.
16. F. FELDBRUGGE, SAMIZDAT AND POLITICAL DISSENT IN THE SOVIET UNION 4 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FELDBRUGGE].
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tion of Brezhnev's conservative regression, this other-mindedness began to develop more fully, perhaps partly in reaction to the creeping restrictiveness in
social democracy in the early 1960s. The samizdat and other forms of extralegal articulation, which had been largely crushed under Stalin and then
rendered superfluous during Khruschev's reforms, now crept back onto the
scene.1 7 As the conservative leadership tightened the ratchet on social liberalization, individual divergences from the new norms inevitably cropped up
more frequently. By 1965 this scattered disillusionment had assumed the tone
of dissent-although on a measured and isolated scale-and of growing defiance of existing legal norms.' 8
17.

THE SOVIET CENSORSHIP

(M. Dewhirst & R. Farrell eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Dew-

hirst & Farrell], passim. On samizdat, see note 20 infra.

18. Article 125 of the 1936 Stalin Constitution provided for explicit constraints on the rights
of Soviet citizens to free speech, press and assembly:
In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the
s6cialist system, the citizens of the U.S.S.R. are guaranteed by law: [the rights to speech,
press and assembiy are then enumerated].
Konstitutsia (Constitution) art. 128 (USSR 1936), reprinted in HAZARD, supra note 10, at 239. The
newly adopted 1977 "Brezhnev" Constitution provides no real change from the 1936 Constitution: "In accordance with the [working] people's interests and for the purpose of strengthening
and developing the socialist system, USSR citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press,
of assembly..." THE CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, Nov. 9, 1977, at 6. ("Working" appeared in a draft of the Constitution, but was deleted in the final version. "And developing" did
not appear in the draft version, but was added to the final version.)
Criminal law sanctions for violation of this constitutional constraint are provided by Article 70
of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and analogous provisions of the criminal codes of the other
Union Republics:
Anti-Soviet Agitation and Propaganda. Agitation or propaganda carried on for the purpose

of subverting or weakening the Soviet regime [vlast'] or of committing particular, especially dangerous crimes against the state, or the circulation, for the same purpose of slanderous fabrications which defame the Soviet state and social system, or the circulation or
preparation or keeping, for the same purpose, of literature of such content, shall be
punished by deprivation of freedom for a term of six months to seven years, with or
without additional exile for a term of two to five years.
The same actions committed by a person convicted of especially dangerous crimes
against the state or committed in wartime shall be punished by deprivation of freedom
for a term of three to ten years, with or without additional exile for a term of two to five
years. [Ved. (1962), No. 29, item 449, Edict July 25, 1962] reprinted in H. BERMAN & J.
SPINDLER, SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE. Conduct in violation of Article 70 constitutes an "especially dangerous" crime against the state.
In 1966, in response to the particular problems of proof of slanderous purpose posed by Article 70 in the Sinyanski-Daniel trial (they pleaded lack of requisite intent), article 190-1 was added
to the criminal code. Under this enactment the defamatory character of the utterance is a question not of intent but of fact. Article 190-1 is now applied to the majority of speech-related dissident offenses.
Article 190-1. Circulation of FabricationsKnown to Be False Which Defame Soviet State and So-

cial System. The systematic circulation in an oral form of fabrications known to be false
which defame the Soviet state and social system and, likewise, the preparation'or circulation in written, printed or any other form of works of such content shall be punished by
deprivation of freedom for a term not exceeding three years, or by correctional-tasks for
a term not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding 100 rubles. [Ved. (1966), no.
38, item 1038, Edict September 16, 1966.] Id. at 180-81.
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The 1965 trial for anti-Soviet slander of Sinyanski and Daniel' 9 registered
the regime's concern that despite social retrenchment, the permissible boundary of social liberalization had been exceeded. The samizdat impulse intensified in reaction to this particular repression and to the subsequent tightening of police controls over intellectual dissent. Under the conservative regime,
other-mindedness assumed a boldness which was unknown during the most
liberal period of Khruschev's social experimentation. 0 A spectrum of divergence coalesced around the samizdat media, ranging from fundamental national chauvinism to religious revivalism, to neo-Leninist reform, to rule-oflaw democratic socialism."1 The Czechoslovakian pacification by the Soviet-led
Warsaw Pact further galvanized the democratic elements of this dissent into
something approximating an incipient movement, despite increasing repression.2 2 While this democratic opposition was largely suppressed in the early to
mid-1970s, 2 3 it provided the inspirational nucleus, despite the attrition and
19. ON TRIAL: THE SOVIET STATE VERSUS "ABRAM TERZ" AND "NIKOLAI ARZHAK" (Max Hayward, trans. and ed. 1966).
20. On Soviet censorship and the government's monopoly over ideas, see generally Dewhirst &
Farrell, supra note 17. For a short but detailed description of the operation of Glavlit, the Soviet
censorship mechanism, see Vladimirov, Glavit: How the Soviet Censor Works, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP,
Aut./Win. 1972, at 31.
All official publication in the Soviet Union is accomplished through state-owned publishing
houses following governmental and semi-official vetting described in the above sources. All equipment associated with the production of literature for public readership is state-owned, whether it
be heavy presses or manually operated mimeographs. During Stalin's time, typewriters were also
controlled items, being subject to state registration, but this is no longer the case. See Loeber,
Samizdat Under Soviet Law, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Aut./Win. 1973 at 16.
Publication outside this official regimen is possible, employing the scant means available to
the individual, usually through cooperative, hand-to-hand typewriter reproduction. This selfpublication, or samizdat, is not illegal per se, although it stands outside approved Soviet procedure. Samizdat's illegality, rather, lies in its content, which may range in time and according to
official sensibilities from innocuous to criminally actionable. See note 18 supra. For the legal status
of samizdat, see Loeber, Samizdat Under Soviet Law, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Aut. 1973, at 3.
A sound official view on this wavy, ad hoc boundary between safe and objectionable public utterance is provided in Chkhikvadze, THE STATE, DEMOCRACY AND LEGALITY IN THE U.S.S.R.:
LENIN'S IDEAS TODAY 208, 218-24 (D. Ogden trans. 1972). The same demarcation is viewed by
one who often challenged its authority in CHALIDZE, To DEFEND THESE RIGHTS (G. Daniels trans.
1974) [hereinafter cited as CHALIDZE].
Samizdat just as accurately may include self-published material of whatever type which does not
make its first appearance within the Soviet Union, but which is smuggled abroad for wider pIblication, perhaps to be reintroduced later into the Soviet Union in printed samizdat form. Such reentry may be accomplished by radio broadcast from numerous Western radio stations. This form
of material, radizdat, is said to combine with other forms of self-publication to afford some measure of cross-pollenization of oppositional thinking. FELDBRUGGE, supra note 16, at 6.
21. FELDBRUGGE, supra note 16 at 104.
22. For the operative facts and Soviet legal theory attending the invasion of Czechoslovakia,
see Ramundo, Czechoslovakia and the Law of Peaceful Coexistence: Legal Characterizationin the Soviet
National Interest, 22 STANFORD LAW REV. 963 (1970). Outrage over the force of Soviet will upon
the Czech liberalizers was a singular galvanizing force for the democratic opposition during the
1960s. FELDBRUGGE, supra note 16, at 109, 111. See also, CHALIDZE, supra note 20; M. Hayward, supra note 19.
23.

Hearings, supra note 5, at 24. See also, id. at 25-39.
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turnover of personalities, for today's democratic opposition, which operates in
various parts of the Soviet Union under the rubric of the Helsinki Agree24
ment's human rights monitoring groups.
These groups and individual dissidents are dealt with by increasingly Dra26
25
conian means. The application of legal controls, administrative sanctions
and psychiatric measures 27 has reached a high point indeed when measured
against either the Khruschev period or Lenin's NEP. Official repression of
dissent now more nearly approximates the conditions of the Stalin era, without indiscriminate mass terror. In terms of the facility of the legal system as a
tool for securing social discipline, in terms of the resort to extra-legal repression, 28 In terms of the polemics in the Soviet press against social permissiveness, 29 the climate in the Soviet Union for an expanded application of human
rights is at least adverse and worsening.
Given this hyper-reactive and retrogressive approach by the Soviet leadership to social liberalization, how can any real enhancement in the condition of
Soviet human rights be pursued through highly visible international demarche, likely on the one hand to stir Soviet defensiveness and on the other
to heighten the expectations of the Soviet opposition. Either of these reactions
to conspicuous external aggravation of the already destabilized Soviet human
rights situation will only further intensify reactionary forces. The only result
of such aggravation can be the further validation of the Stalinist style in the
hands of the conservatives, who will likely be facilitated thereby in their effort
to remain in power after Brezhnev.
At the same time, a broadening of public antiregime sentiment is conceivable, perhaps in concert with similar popular movements in authoritarian Eastern European regimes. This breakdown of social control may begin as a
spreading of expectations from the intellectual opposition to national, religious, economic and perhaps aspirational (class-oriented) elements. The result
24. "Open Letter to Representatives of States Participating in the Belgrade Conference" (September 1977). Khronika Press, 505 Eighth Avenue, New York, New York 10018.
25.

CHALIDZE, supra note 20, at 67-68.

26.

See note 5, supra.

27. S. Bloch & P. Reddaway, PSYCHIATRIC TERROR: How SOVIET PSYCHIATRY IS USED TO
SUPPRESS DISSENT (1977); see also, Fainberg, My Five Years in Mental Hospitals, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Summer 1975, at 67.

28. In recent years, with the landmark being the forcible exile in February, 1974 of
Solzhenitsyn, the Soviets have increasingly resorted to external exile as a device for reducing the
domestic influence of dissidents. External exile was abolished de jure as part of the 1958 Soviet
criminal law reform. I. Lapenna, SOVIET PENAL POLICY 88 (1968).
29. See, e.g., The Bukovsky Case and Soviet Law, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, Oct. 27, 1976, at 9, reprinted in CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, Dec. 1, 1976, at 1; Pravda Hits West's Defense of
Dissidents, PRAVDA, Feb. 12, 1977, at 4, reprinted in CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, March
10, 1977, at 1; Gusev, Moscow, on Sakharov, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 23, 1977, at A-23, col. 3; Letter from Aleksandr Petrov to Literaturnaya Gazeta, Feb. 2, 1977, at 14, reprinted in CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, Feb. 23, 1977, at 3.
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of such a scenario is not fanciful: perhaps a revival of neo-Stalinism to preserve the status quo, or the failure of such a regime attempt and the disintegration of a complex social system into contending national, ethnic and interest sectors, not the least of which would be conservatively oriented communist
traditionalists and patriotic Russian nationalists. This formula guarantees little
but bloodshed and the widespread, probably protracted diminution of human
values in a balkanized Soviet society." The worst case projection of this development should include the Soviet application internationally, perhaps without
justifiable cause, of nuclear force to hold back those foreign powers who
might exploit domestic upheaval to alter international power relationships."
In either its neo-Stalinist or disintegrative aspect, this destabilizing approach, this exacerbation of the defensive syndrome and of unjustifiably
aroused expectations can do little to further the cause of world order and the
maximization of human values. On the contrary, the means-end program for
an expansion of human rights under socialism lies in the evolutionary, not the
disintegrative potential of the conservative Soviet system. In most cases the
pace of this process necessarily will be less than that which would suggest a
measurable cause-effect response to the foreign policy process.
The key to this slow liberalization lies in the Soviet leadership's slow advance from reactive bureaucratic conservatism to the rational style of management, and therefore of governance, required of a modernizing social system.
The Soviet Union has run its course of basic nation-building, with authoritarianism providing the motive force for crash industrialization and economic
collectivization.3 2 Victory was procured from a cataclysmic world war and economic reconstruction from a wasted national territory. The question today,
however, is whether the old authoritarian style is appropriate under condi30. This is Amalrik's crisis theory. See AMALRIK, supra note 6, at 40.
31. A. Ulam, AMERICAN-SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS: SOME REFLECTIONS; The Great Power Triangle; Selected Comments, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Senate
Committee on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1971). [This material is reprinted
from A. ULAM, THE RIVALS: AMERICA AND RUSSIA SINCE WORLD WAR II (1971)].
The dangers of the nuclear age then impose a peculiar consideration of prudence and
conservatism upon both superpowers [the U.S.S.R. and the United States-EDF]. Neither
can afford a violent internal conflict nor wish such troubles upon the other. This is a
somber reflection, for it prevents us from wishing that for their own sake as well as that
of the world the Soviet people could drastically alter the system under which they live.
Requirements of peace, more particularly of saving the world from a nuclear holocaust
which a tottering totalitarian regime might unleash, take precedence over those of democracy. We should not expect that the regime we will deal with in Russia for many
years to come will be other than an authoritarian one, that any basis for accommodation
with the U.S.S.R. will be other than one of mutual interest. Id. at 31.
32. These same ends may well have been attainable through less drastic means. The economic
and human casualty attributable to the early Bolshevik and later Stalin excesses may well have
been channeled to the very tasks from which they were diverted. I. DEUTSCHER, STALIN: A PoLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 311-57, 624 (2d ed. 1967); MEDVEDEV, supra note 15, at 239; A. SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO 1918-1956 (T. Whitney trans. 1973), at 55-57.
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tions of "developed socialism, ' 3 3 increasing well-being and putative domestic
stability.

34

Regressive authoritarianism may well be a stereotyped response by the
Soviet regime to the threat seen in the various elements of present day dissent, to the threat perceived from the human rights foreign policy of the nonsocialist world, and to the threat to ideological insulation posed by the penetration into the Soviet Union of alien ideas through foreign literature, radio
broadcasts35 and foreign contacts. But this is only one aspect of the problem
facing the ageing Soviet leadership, a leadership subject to displacement in
the near future by groups now quietly contending over the present regressive
style of governing and its alternatives.
The challenge to liberalization in the Soviet Union at this point does not
involve blatant denials under legal and other formulae of the rights of Soviet
citizens to free assembly, speech, press and to security of the person in all of
its aspects. The main challenge at present is that the leadership cannot relinquish to the proper sectors the measure of operating discretion necessary to
more fully rationalize national output priorities, development, production and
distribution. The Party remains locked into rigid national planning and control of managerial supervision down to the lowest operating level, despite the
fact that these forms have outlived all utility save ideological consistency and
the preservation of vested interests.3 6 There has developed in the Soviet
Union a significant, but bridled, non-apparatus leadership capability-in the
enterprises, in the professional and technical institutes, and in the bureaucracy itself-which is capable of contributing to rationalized national decisionmaking.
It is from this source that a moderation of the authoritarian style may issue as the Party on the one hand finds its way toward assimilating this group
and thereby of transforming itself to a rationalized, less ideological institution.
On other hand, the Party may assume a less exclusive role through cooperation with, while still controlling, various harmonious extra-party rationalizing
33. Currently, the Soviet progression from bourgeois overthrow to pure communism is said to
be at the point of a "developed socialist society," as described in the Preamble to the 1977 Constitution of the U.S.S.R. THE CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, Nov. 9, 1977, at 1.
34. Principal observers on all gradations of the oppositional spectrum reject the efficacy of reactionary authoritarianism in a modernizing Soviet society. See generally AMALRIK, supra note 6; A.
SAKHAROV, PROGRESS, COEXISTENCE AND INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM (N.Y. Times trans. 1968);
MEDVEDEV, supra note 15.
35. See note 20 supra. The sensitivity of the Soviet Union and Eastern European regimes to

the activities of Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and RIAS has been strongly voiced in sessions
of the Belgrade follow-up conference to the 1975 Helsinki Conference. N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
1977, § A, at 26, col. 1; id., Sept. 30, 1977, § A, at 6, col. 1; id., Jan. 23, 1978, § A, at 9, col. 3;

U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE, FOURTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE COMMISSION ON SE-

CURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,

36.

See

J. HOUGH,

MAKING, at

178 (1969).

24 (1978).

THE SOVIET PREFECTS: THE LOCAL PARTY ORGANS IN INDUSTRIAL DECISION
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interests. 7 In this pressure toward modernization lies the best hope for the
ultimate betterment of Soviet human rights; the destability model promises
only regressive authoritarianism. Modernizers and rationalizers, as any other
group, also may be inclined toward authoritarian repression to preserve their
advantage, and may thus become the defenders of a new status quo, armed in
addition with an ideology suited to this purpose. But this is neither an inevitable nor a permanent condition. They, too, by necessity may be compelled to
moderate, to accept or to coexist with domestic influences hopefully pushing
toward an incremental lessening of authoritarianism. In any event, keeping
this tendency on a liberal course should be the prime interest of the foreign
policy of interacting states, rather than the fueling of retrogressive tendencies
by providing dissidents with the basis for demands for sudden and systemic
change.
How then to abet a slow but productive movement away from authoritarianism while minimizing present day excesses in the violation of human rights?
This dilemma is the essence of today's foreign relations, for Soviet as well as
for Western policy. Foreign policy and human rights cannot be viewed as
Soviet negatives being manipulated by Western positives. There are reciprocal interests here, as well as antagonisms. On the one hand, the Soviet Union
is faced with its somewhat diminished commitment forever to steer clear of
Stalinist repression; at the same time, it must allow vent to individualistic and
pluralistic tendencies which are the product of a modernizing, educated society, aspiring to a quality of life often at odds with social discipline. 8
37. The new Soviet constitution has conspicuously enhanced the legal status of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union over its former oblique position as only the leading, most active
and politically conscious of all Soviet public organizations. KONSTTUTSIA (Constitution) art. 126
(U.S.S.R. 1936), reprinted in HAZARD, supra note 10, at 239-40. Article 6 of the Constitution of
1977 gives exclusive treatment to the Party's role without reference to other public organizations.
Contrasted to the 1936 provision, the new constitution is explicit on the overt political and statal
role of the Party:
Article 6. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the leading and guiding force of
Soviet society, the nucleus of its political system and of all state and public organizations.
The CPSU exists for the people and serves the people.
Armed with the Marxist-Leninist teachings, the Communist Party determines general
prospects for the development of society and the lines of the U.S.S.R.'s domestic and
foreign policy, directs the great creative ability of the Soviet people, and gives their
struggle for victory of communism a planned, scientifically substantiated nature.
KONSTITUTSIA, art. 6 (U.S.S.R. 1977), supra note 33 at 2.
This straightforward constitutional legitimization of the Party at first glance seems to provide
sound insulation against erosion and displacement of the Party over time as the discipline of the
Stalin period fades and new generations assume leadership. The security of such legal institutionalization may, by the same token, permit the Party to undergo, without suffering legal and
fatal mutation, a degree of base-broadening in response to its natural penetration by rationalizing
elements.
38. The phenomenon of giving vent to social pressures may just as well lie at the heart of the
Khruschev liberalizations as any more ulterior explanation. Similarly, that dissident themes have
indeed existed in Soviet society since that time may indicate more than a Soviet inability to sup-
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The better course (aimed at securing a broadened, though undramatic betterment over time in human conditions) is a U.S. foreign policy emphasizing
the carrot over the stick. The human rights issue should be separated from
the geopolitical concerns over Soviet imperialism and over arms control, and
these concerns treated as discrete issues without the employment of human
rights as a bargaining chip; the latter tactic can only bode ill for the present
day status of human rights and of individual dissidents. The framework has
been built for the push of the Soviet Union along the road toward moderation. This framework arises from the network for bilateral relations established in the early detente period between the Soviet Union, the United States
and others.
These relations were defined throughout the Helsinki Final Act, chiefly by
Principle IX, Cooperation Among States, of Basket I, Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States,39 and by the undertakings in the section on Cooperation in the Field of Economics, of Science and
Technology and of the Environment. It is in these areas that, through contact
and relations over time, the more moderate tendencies in Soviet authority
may be strengthened at the expense of the dogmatic and xenophobic. Similarly, the more benign provisions of Basket 3, Cooperation in Humanitarian
and Other Fields, are proper grounds for present, direct, but nonantagonistic
dealings. 40 Emphasis here should focus upon those aspects of human contacts
and circulation of information and of cultural and educational cooperation
that do not raise the immediate specter of the sudden penetration today of
permissiveness, or of the diminution of Party control over behavior or ideas.
press these phenomena, but an intention instead to permit a degree of open venting of "othermindedness." Toleration of discordance can serve several useful purposes beyond supporting the
claim internationally that Soviet society is in fact an open society. Additionally, the regime obtains
a barometer of sorts, indicating how a small but perhaps symptomatic segment of society perceives its milieu generally and present Soviet policy in particular. In a country that otherwise permits little upward percolation of popular critical thought, the dissident phenomenon may represent a useful form of social feedback and perhaps of social input.
Similarly, the Jewish emigration since 1967 and the outflow of ethnic Germans since 1972 can
be interpreted as much as an example of sensible social venting as a defensive response to international indignation and diplomatic pressure. Here, after all, are groups which for reasons dis-

tinct from international pressure have elected to disassociate with Soviet society. Or perhaps their
number represents a failure of the idea of assimilation to a society characterized by increasing
hostility and decreasing prospects for mobility and opportunity-changes which may reflect official defensiveness to the international focus drawn to these groups.
39. Principle IX, Basket 1, Final Act, supra note 1,at 81: ILM, supra note 1, at 1295.
40. Realistic progress in relations and an ultimate softening in internal Soviet conditions may
be had by pursuing the short run humanitarian objectives of Basket 3 without boldly striking to(lay to accomplish the more long range objective of liberalization in areas which imminently
threaten the Party's monopoly over social behavior and ideas. The major fields for cooperation
detailed in Basket 3, Final Act, supra note 1,at 113, i.e., Human Contacts; Information; Cooperation
and Exchanges in the Field of Cultures; Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Education, can all be
pushed vigorously without the concomitant demand that domestic controls and standards be
modified. These controls perforce will undergo natural modification as the maturation of Soviet
society and its changing leadership admits.
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This process of relaxation, which may be protracted to the dissatisfaction
of many observers and interested parties within and without the Soviet Union
will doubtless be accompanied by continued individual or uniform violations
of human rights. This behavior justifiably will draw the expressed concern of
external supporters of human rights. But the representations and inducements of foreign governments on behalf of better treatment or individual relief are best conducted obliquely; that approach will be most compatible with
the ongoing push for the unavoidable self-reorientation of the Soviet leadership's domestic outlook.
A program for the enhancement of human rights under authoritarian
Soviet socialism should thus be aimed at the reduction of the conservative authoritarian element. The product of blatant authoritarianism-systematic and
mass violation of human rights-has largely passed with Stalin's death. The
task of expanded human rights protection, and therefore of a human rights
oriented foreign policy, should be to assure that conservative elements have
little pretext to revive this repressive condition, and that there is little to detract from a moderation which could develop from within the Soviet Union,
given the proper environment. The attenuation of authoritarianism is the end
and the means lie in closer, nonantagonistic relations between the Soviet
Union and those nations that seek the enhancement of human rights. Thus,
ultimate betterment of human rights will be achieved not as a direct result,
but as the ultimate byproduct of patient international relations.

